Let me begin with a caveat - I never really liked Selig Harrison, who competes with the University of Chicago's Bruce Cumings as America's #1 North Korea apologist. However, his June 6 interview ("Finding a Way Out With North Korea") with that reputable paper of record, the NYT, left me speechless. Stupefied. Aghast. Allow me to share it with you:

Q: Was it a good idea for the United States to agree two days ago to pull back American forces from the demilitarized zone that separates North and South Korea?

A: I think they're doing the right thing for the wrong reasons and in the wrong way.

It's long overdue to do this because the threat of another North Korean attack on the South, as in 1950, is remote. North Korea is in such bad shape economically that it could not sustain a protracted war. North Korean forces are forward-deployed at the DMZ to deter us, to make an American pre-emptive strike unacceptably costly, not to attack the South again. Also, it's desirable for the United States to end its role as a "tripwire," so that we're not automatically involved. But the reasons they're pulling back are the wrong ones.

The Pentagon wants to get American forces out of harm's way in order to have greater flexibility when and if they decide on military action against North Korea. They're doing this in the context of a confrontational American posture toward North Korea, which is unfortunate.

The right way to pull back American forces would have been as part of a policy of improving relations with the North. We should have traded American pullbacks for Korean pullbacks.

"North Korean forces are forward-deployed at the DMZ to deter us, to make an American pre-emptive strike unacceptably costly, not to attack the South again."
Come again? I have to wonder whether the good scholar has ever taken a look at the force structure of the Inmingun (People's Army), which luckily for us is posted over at Global Security.org for all to see. What's that you see? 25 special operations brigades? That wouldn't be the world's largest special-ops force, per chance? Why, yes they would be. Would Mr. Harrison please speculate as to why the North Koreans would continue to devote increasingly dear resources on maintaining such a force, which is dedicated to infiltration missions deep inside South Korea, if the North Korean military wasn't seriously contemplating an invasion of their slightly better-fed brothers to the South?

North Korea also maintains a 2 to 1 ration in tanks and artillery over the combined US-ROK forces to the South; it also fields 35 mechanized brigades and possesses one of the world's largest submarine fleets. This is not the makings of a deterrent force, unless your definition of deterrence calls for reaching Pusan in the shortest time possible. It's about as defensive as Soviet forces based in East Germany were - meaning not very.

As far as this sinister plot to launch pre-emptive strikes on the North from the safety of positions far south of the DMZ is concerned, it's sheer nonsense. Ralph Cossa, Asian specialist at the Center for Strategic and International Studies' Pacific Forum, addresses this ludicrous but nevertheless pervasive assertion by pointing out that:

Once this "tripwire" is removed, the theory goes, Washington will then feel more comfortable about attacking North Korea. This ignores the fact that the real tripwire is the tens of billions of dollars of American direct foreign investment in South Korea and the tens of thousands of American businessman and tourists (not to mention military families) that are located within artillery range of North Korea, whose missiles could reach American forces regardless of where they are based in the ROK (or even in Japan, for that matter).

And as far as "trading American pullbacks for North Korean ones" is concerned, one just has to wonder how a million man force can view the 13,000 strong Second Infantry Division as such a mortal threat that it would be willing to consider significant withdrawals away from the DMZ should the 2ID be removed. The DPRK would never countenance such a trade, because its forces aren't sitting along the DMZ to stop the Americans - they're there to put pressure on the South, and quite possibly to invade it.

Q: How do you think North Korea will react to this?

A: They'll be very suspicious that it is connected to possible future military action against them. They will read it in the context of the current talk in Washington about promoting regime change or a collapse in North Korea and the unwillingness of the United States to negotiate about their economic and security concerns in return for an end to their nuclear program.

Would someone please explain to me why the United States has a responsibility to negotiate with the North Koreans because of their economic and security concerns? Perhaps I missing something, but it would seem to me that Pyongyang's economic troubles are of its own making; certainly, the United States isn't responsible for the North Koreans' insane economic policies. As far as the North's security concerns are concerned, those concerns are equally of their own making; the only time Pyongyang finds itself the object of "unwanted" American attention is when it does something intentionally designed to get that attention. It's a state that views crisis as a way of life, a way to obtain the means of survival from the West while avoiding basic socio-economic reforms that could threaten the viability of the regime. If North Korea feels that the United States is unwilling to "negotiate" about their homemade economic and security concerns, perhaps they're correct.

Q: What about the South Korean reaction?

A: There are mixed feelings in the South. The government is afraid that any change in the status quo will affect the stock market and the influx of foreign investment by giving the impression of an unstable security situation. But the younger generation wants a gradual American disengagement. They see the present American diplomatic confrontation with the North and the presence of the American forces as obstacles to improved North-South relations and eventual reunification. If the impression grows that this is indeed designed to give the United States greater flexibility, with an eye to military action, then the reaction will be very negative.

Let's make something very clear - I am a long-term resident of the Republic of Korea, I love this country, and regard it as my home. That being said, I see no reason why Washington should care what the South Korean public thinks. Does Seoul care what the American public thinks? Yes, but only as far as its own interests are concerned. Not that there is anything wrong with that - it's the South Korean government's responsibility to look after the interests of its tax payers, not America's. Likewise, it's not Washington's responsibility to base policy on the whims of a South Korean public that's unwilling to trade Seoul for Los Angeles (understandably so, by the way). The view of Korea's younger generation, as cited by Harrison, are so absurd that they hardly merit discussion here, let alone consideration by American foreign policy makers.

Q: Still, you are optimistic that the North Korean leadership can be convinced to refrain from building more nuclear weapons?

A: I think they're ready to dismantle their nuclear program under adequate inspections if we're prepared to pay what they consider an acceptable price. First, we'd have to join in a bilateral or multilateral agreement pledging not to use our nuclear weapons against North Korea, an agreement that would have to be linked to a de-nuclearization process. Second, we'd have to pledge not to pursue the policy of regime change that President Bush has made clear is his preferred approach to North Korea. Third, we'd have to be prepared for large-scale energy and food aid. If we pursue pressure tactics that they would view as designed to overthrow the present regime, they are certain to respond either militarily or through other retaliation such as selling nuclear material to anti-American third parties.

Isn't it kind of curious that the "acceptable price" North Korea demands (for ceasing to do what it shouldn't have been doing in the first place!) always seems to go up every time this whole nuclear thing pops up? I've already discussed the problems involved with negotiating a permanent settlement to this problem in a previous op-ed piece here at the Command Post; suffice it to say, you'll see pigs sprout wings and fly before you see the North Koreans voluntarily dismantle their nuclear facilities. The most you can hope for is to negotiate temporary halts, and even those will come at increasingly dear prices.

Q: Do you agree with some analysts who argue that North Korea's recent behavior and threatening statements have alienated China, which was previously sympathetic to their cause?

A: I think China is equally disgusted with the United States and North Korea and will exercise pressure on both countries to change their present policies. I'm sure they're telling the North Koreans not to threaten us. But they've made it very clear that they believe the United States should be willing to trade commitment to North Korea relating to its military and economic security in exchange for verifiable dismantlement of its nuclear program.

I think China is insisting that the United States conclude a bilateral security agreement with North Korea and would be prepared for a multilateral, six-power agreement involving the United States, China, Russia, Japan, South Korea and North Korea. The external powers would commit themselves not to deploy nuclear weapons in Korea. And the two Koreas would pledge not to make nuclear weapons. This would require inspection machinery centering on, but not limited to, the International Atomic Energy Agency.

My own view is that such a six-power de-nuclearization is the most promising way to resolve the current crisis because it would not require the Bush administration to give a bilateral security guarantee to North Korea. The administration has refused to do that, but some form of security assurance to North Korea is required. We cannot expect North Korea to give up its nuclear options if we continue to maintain our "nuclear umbrella" and assert our right to pre-emptive military strikes.

If China is disgusted with the United States now, wait until Beijing reaps what its inactivity in Korea has sowed - a Japanese nuclear program, possibly combined with a massive conventional buildup. China, together with South Korea, has steadfastly maintained the fiction that it is not a direct party to the crisis. It uses the situation on the Korean peninsula in order to humiliate the United States and weaken its influence on the Pacific Rim. Being somewhat of a fan of realpolitik, I can appreciate what Beijing is doing. But the Chinese leadership should know that the Middle Kingdom is not the only nation that can play such games. The United States can easily remove itself from the fray, declare North Korea a regional problem, take its ball and bat (or the Second Infantry Division, be it as it may) and go home. The ramifications of such a move would be enormous, and not necessarily contrary to American interests. Northeast Asia's two democracies, Japan and South Korea, would instantly go nuclear, and now all of a sudden, Asia's communist dictatorships no longer possess a monopoly on the military use of the atom. Beijing would go from encouraging the US to give in to North Korean demands for concessions to being forced to show some degree of strategic responsibility. It would no longer be able to pretend that North Korea is America's problem, that's for certain.

Q:What has been the impact of the American victory in Iraq on North Korea?

A: There is no question that the lesson that the North Koreans have learned from Iraq is that it needs a nuclear deterrent. The American unilateralism reflected in Iraq and in many other ways is alienating the United States from China, Russia, South Korea and Japan. We could end up with the worst of both worlds - a nuclear North Korea and estranged relations with countries important to us globally as well as regionally.

The lesson Pyongyang should have learned from Iraq is that being a bastion of anti-Americanism with an active WMD program is not conducive to regime survival. Still, being a peace-loving man and living well within North Korean missile range, I have no problem with the North developing its own "deterrent," as long as its not willing to transcend deterrence by selling its goodies on the open market. Unlike Iraq, the United States was never really considering an invasion of North Korea, anyhow.

And American unilateralism? The reason the United States is acting unilaterally in North Korea is that the other regional powers refuse to take active roles of their own. As William Safire put it, "[o]ur Asian friends are quite content to let the United States "engage" the threat alone. Unilateral U.S. appeasement suddenly looks good to them; let the sunshine in." It's always easy to pick on American unilateralism, or at least until you're forced to make meaningful foreign policy choices of your own.

Q: Contrary to the expectations of many policymakers, you argue that North Korea is not about to collapse. Why?

A: Not only is North Korea more effectively insulated from outside influences than the countries of Eastern Europe, but it also has a nationalist mystique and a Confucian historical legacy that makes its totalitarian system more broadly accepted than was the case in Eastern Europe. The late Kim Il Sung is revered as the George Washington of his country.

My disagreement with Mr. Harrison on this point is not so with his conclusion as it is with his reasons. I, too, am not so sure that North Korea is on the verge of collapse, but that's because after a decade of severe material deprivation, North Korea resembles a nation of shock victims more than it does a nation of budding revolutionaries. There's no question that Kim Il Sung is "revered" in North Korea, but then again, so were Stalin and Mao while they were alive. And Mr. Harrison's Confucian critique is way off base; South Korea is just as Confucian as North Korea (more so, actually - Korea's "Confucian Heartland" has always been in the South, while pre-colonial North Korea was better known as a hotbead of Western missionary activity), yet if the massive pro-democracy demonstrations that brought down South Korea's comparatively less-odious military dictatorship in 1987 are anything to go by, Confucianists can love freedom as much as anyone can. The fact that the two Koreas, despite sharing a common cultural heritage, have developed (or not) in two completely divergent directions simply undermines any attempt to explain the situation in the North in terms of culture. North Korea might not collapse over night, but there's no reason to associate one of the world's richest cultures with that monstrosity that is the DPRK.