"Where are those cheering crowds we were told would come out to greet us?"

Scholar Bernard Lewis looks examines this question. Like other commentators, Lewis feels that the 1991 uprising, and the lack of support for it back then is not forgotten. He also thinks that the military strategy of bypassing the south to go on to Bagdhdad, while sound militarily, left enough of Saddam's enforcers in place to keep the population quiet.

Lewis sees one other factor at work that may surprise you:

Their understandable caution was further reinforced by the strong and vocal opposition to the war around the world and more especially in the United States. This manifested itself in many ways and, under their very eyes, in the mostly critical questioning of the military by the media in the press briefings taking place on their doorstep.

For us in the West, this is the normal free debate of an open society. But Iraqis, both rulers and ruled, have had no experience of any such thing since the overthrow of the parliamentary regime and the establishment of the dictatorship almost 50 years ago. What they believe they see is indecision, hesitation, even weakness and fear.

This could only intensify their worry that once again the United States may flinch from finishing the job, and reach some kind of accommodation, if not with Saddam Hussein himself, then with some like-minded but more amenable successor, found among his entourage. There are indeed audible voices advocating just such a resolution of the conflict.

The public debate against the war will be similarly understood--or rather misunderstood--both by Saddam Hussein and by his subjects, and will have the unintended effect of encouraging him and discouraging them. The antiwar campaign will not end the war, but it may turn out to have made it longer and harder.