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March 29, 2003
The Death of a Thousand Cuts
The battle of Basra appears to be following a script worked out long before the war began. It certainly will be the pattern for dealing with Iraqi cities in future, though there are bound to be variations for local conditions. The basic problem: How do you neutralise a hard-core resistance that is (quite sensibly ) taking advantage of the Coalition's unwillingness to cause civilian casualties. Remember, defeating Ba'athist armed forces is not enough to win: we must also spare those of the great majority, the terrorised not the terrorists. We must win the Peace as well as win the War. Not merely that, but the majority of the population of the US, UK and Australia would not countenance any un-neccessary civilian casualties caused by the Coalition. It may be argued that going in sooner would result in fewer civilian deaths, but I'll take it as read that this isn't acceptable. It's a knotty problem, and the Ba'athists obviously thought it would tie us up in those knots. If we go in guns blazing, mob-handed, they thought there'd be a Stalingrad - or rather, the same situation that was found in Bremen, Germany, in late 1945, where a few fanatic Nazis and SS held up the Allied advance for a week. They caused the destruction of the city and death of both many Allied soldiers and even more German civilians. Should we halt at the edges, then guerilla activity and lightning raids, sometimes by suicide bombers whose families were hostage to the Ba'athists, would wear us down, in a "Death of a Thousand Cuts". Or maybe some chemical strikes via mines and booby-traps (which haven't eventuated - yet). We'd be stopped at the gates, unable to go back or go forward. Pre-war, I certainly wasn't sure of what they'd got in store for us, but I was sure they'd have something. That was the Cunning Plan, and a rather good one in my opinion. But it hasn't quite turned out that way. The counter is obvious: do some long-distance patrolling, guerilla activity and lightning raids of our own. Raise an (almost) impregnable shield around the city, and send in task forces to kill or capture the hard-core that resistance relies upon. The Rapier, or rather, the Scalpel not the Bludgeon. Key-hole surgery at that. For we could absolutely guarantee the support of the populace, who'd let us know where the Ba'athists were. That, plus non-Humint (phone intercepts, recon via unmanned drones etc) and we'd slowly but inexorably chip away at the Ba'athist cadre. A tank raid here (I wasn't expecting this degree of boldness though), an assassination there, and if a lot of them gathered together to co-ordinate, a few well-aimed laser-guided bombs. The removal of Saddam's visage to show that he was no Count Dracula to return from the grave. The Death of a Thousand Cuts alright. Once the cadre had been reduced so much they couldn't keep the local pouplace from lynching them, then and only then would we go in. There is no good defence against this - obvious measure to ameliorate the situation, such as holding Ba'athist party meetings in Pre-schools just avoid one attack method (laser guided bombs in this case), they don't stop the others. There's a few more tricks I've thought of, but I'm sure the Brits, Aussies and Yanks are keeping those in reserve as a nice surprise, so I won't spoil it for them. In all probability, there'll be Ba'athist strategems I haven't thought of, and Coalition counters to them. That's what professional military people do, I'm just an armchair General, not a real one. The only danger: that the Iraqi Werewolves would be able to cause so many Coalition casualties that we'd bleed to death ourselves. 100 a day, and we'd have real problems. After 10 days, Coalition deaths due to enemy action have been what, 30? Less than Gulf War 1 anyway. A situation that neither I nor (most likely) the Ba'athists find anything other than astounding. Worse than their worst nightmare, better than my wildest dreams. See this Op Ed piece, since quoted by Instapundit, and dated March 24. I'm sure there'll be surprises in future, I'd hoped (though not expected - maybe 20% chance) that a decapitation would lead to immediate collapse, but to me it's still a replay of Germany in April 1945. Complete with a Chamber of Horrors we have yet to fully comprehend, retail not wholesale this time. Comments
In the words of GHWB, the Iraqis need to "take matters into their own hands." Why aren't they? Certainly, a major part of the reason is because they or their family members are being threatened by the Fedayeen etc. However, no doubt there is a significant portion of the population that while they are neither pro-Saddam nor pro-U.S., they've decided that the devil they know is better than the devil they're highly suspicious of. The solution to this is to make our intentions clear and to try to get as many Iraqis on our side as possible. Guns and bombs, while necessary for winning the war, won't do that. Leaflets are only partially effective. TV broadcasts featuring Iraqis (http://www.command-post.org/archives/001411.html) and truthfully presenting our plans (suitably modified from the current position) might work wonders. Unfortunately, things like PR seem to be regarded as unnecessary frippery by the administration. Posted by: Lonewacko at March 29, 2003 09:57 PMTotally agree with Lonewacko: we have to use mass media to either get the locals on our side or keep them in their homes, neutral. The U.S. and the U.K. essentially invented electronic media...why we aren't using it more effectively IS the major failure of the war...but I don't think it'll remain one for long. As to tactics... I'm not a military expert, but guerrilla war depends clearly depends on some basic elements: 1. You MUST have the willing support of the populace. Force and threats can only get you so far. Without that support, you can't survive long. That's why the psy-ops aspect is so important. 2. Guerrillas, like any force, depend on re-supply. Eventually, without re-supply, you will run out of critical items. Basrah isn't Vietnam or Stalingrad or even the West Bank. There is no outside power constantly refreshing your supplies in Iraq. Does anyone really believe that Saddam is shipping tons of supplies to Basrah? It may take some time, but they will have a logistics problem. 3. Guerrillas also need direction. Cut off communications, destroy leadership, and you're left with a force on little more than bandits. They can hurt you, but they can't beat you. 4. You need the countryside. Look at the history of successful guerrilla wars. In every case I can think of in the last 200 years, the successful guerrilla campaigns Vietnam pre-Tet (where the VC was destroyed as a fighting force), Mao's Red Army, Castro, etc., owned the countryside, not the cities. It's vital to control the countryside in order to have many options for retreat and reconstitution of forces. We and the Brits own the countryside. 5. Unconventional tactics succeed when met with conventional tactics. Urban guerillas can be beaten by turning their own tactics (excepting the war crime tactics the thugs are using) against them. Quick strikes, feigned retreats, snatch and grabs, there are a whole host of ways to deal. Early evidence suggest that the British tactics in Basrah are solid. It's going to take some time, but unless we turn the population against us, the thugs are going to get creamed. Posted by: R. McLeod at March 30, 2003 05:28 AMI would posit that we aren't beaming as much PR or propaganda into Basra as we shall is that, so far, there are too many bad guys, Fedayeen, SRG and Baathists running around. If, as reported, women are hanged from lamp posts merely for waving at allied troops, what would be the penalty for watching allied TV? time is on the side of those controlling the siege. those under siege are cut off from orders, supplies and reinforcements. all they really know is that every day they increasingly isolated and that there are less of them. Posted by: angrYkook at March 30, 2003 10:27 AMPost a comment
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