The Command Post - Global Recon

White House Appoints Special Envoy for N. Korea Human Rights

As expected, the White House has appointed Jay Lefkowitz as Special Envoy for Human Rights in North Korea, a position mandated by Section 107 of the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004. In naming Mr. Lefkowitz at this time, the administration appears to have waited for a “decent interval” between negotiating sessions with North Korea during six-nation talks. The Washington Post covered the story with an article written by Reuters, which benefits from actually taking the trouble to contact the people who were behind the NKHRA in the first place:

But U.S. officials said the appointment, announced by the White House, had been in the works for some time and was not aimed at putting pressure on the North Koreans ahead of the resumption of the nuclear talks.

“It’s taken this long to line everything up. I think people will read a little more into the timing than they should,” said one official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity.
. . . .

Suzanne Scholte, a leader of the North Korea Freedom Coalition, said her umbrella group of religious and rights activists had been eagerly waiting for the appointment. “This man I understand is close to President Bush, so that means he’ll have his ear on North Korean human rights, so we’re very excited about the appointment,” she said.

“It’s so critical that we let the North Korean people know that we know that they’re suffering,” said Scholte, whose coalition will stage protests and prayer meetings in Washington over the weekend to support human rights in North Korea.

Christopher Hill, the chief U.S. negotiator in the six-party talks, said this week that he had raised the issue of human rights during the recent session in Beijing. He described rights scrutiny as the “cost of admission” to international society.

My only quibble with the Reuters report is with the estimated death toll of 1 million. Although that number is not outside the range of reasonable estimates, most reasonable estimates of the death toll are twice that.

The New York Times also reported the story, noting that the timing and circumstances of the announcement suggests an effort by the White House to keep the appointment low-key. That seems plausible. If so, don’t expect to hear much from Jay Lefkowitz until after the next session of the six-party talks, scheduled to begin on August 29th. Even less encouraging is the fact that Lefkowitz will continue working his day job with the Washington law firm of Kirkland and Ellis, at least on a part-time basis. That could prove a considerable distraction from his duties as Special Envoy.

Here is the text of Section 107 of the NKHRA, which created the position of Special Envoy:

(a) Special Envoy.—The President shall appoint a special envoy for human rights in North Korea within the Department of State hereafter in this section referred to as the “Special Envoy”). The Special Envoy should be a person of recognized distinction in the field of human rights.

(6) develop an action plan for supporting implementation of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2004/13.

(d) Report on Activities.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually for the subsequent 5 year-period, the Special Envoy shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the activities undertaken in the preceding 12 months under subsection ©.

Interview with North Korea Expert Nicholas Eberstadt, on the Talks and Aftermath

A transcript of my interview with Korea expert Nicholas Eberstadt is here. The primary focus is on diplomatic and other options available to the United States and its allies if the six-party talks turn out to be demonstrable failure.

My thanks to Mr. Eberstadt for being so generous with his time. I’ve posted a version without hyperlinks below. The version on my own blog has hyperlinks where relevant.

My deepest thanks to Nicholas Eberstadt of the American Enterprise Institute for agreeing to a telephone interview. Eberstadt is one of Washington’s most highly regarded Korea experts. The interview ended up lasting a full hour. Nothing has been edited out save one abortive “I don’t know” answer, although may have I missed a few words because I’m no stenographer. Still, this is pretty close to a verbatim transcript. Nick Eberstadt is one of those rare individuals who speaks in complete sentences.

All comments in brackets and hyperlinks are my own. My questions focused on what may well be the terminal phase of the six-party talks, clarifying questions Eberstadt raised in his latest piece for The American Enterprise, and discussing the question that everyone’s assiduously avoided thus far: just exactly what are we to do if the talks demonstrably fail?

I let Mr. Eberstadt see some of the questions in advance (those not truncated by yahoo e-mail), and allowed him to see the completed transcript before publication. This was to afford him the chance to clarify any misquotes or errors, or to add clarifications. On the other hand, I did my best to ask him tough questions.

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OFK: I have a wager going that North Korea will not even show up for the talks scheduled for August 29th, give or take a day. Care to join the pool? There’s a $20 house minimum.

NE: I always lose at bets, so I’ll decline. But the DPRK has a good reason to return if it chooses to do so. Its posture has already opened, still further, the wound in the ROK-US alliance. The ROK Foreign Minister declared last week that his government in principle had no problem with a peaceful nuclear program in North Korea. I suppose that program would proceed in tandem with [North Korea’s] peaceful chemical weapons program, and its peaceful biological weapons program. If I were a North Korean diplomat, I’d come back to the table just to see the U.S. and ROK diplomats eat each other alive over that difference. I can’t predict if the North Koreans will return, but if they do, they will have fun watching us squirm.

OFK: Say I lose. We all know you have a stock ticker in your office that tells you what the Administration is thinking. So just how patient is this Administration willing to be?

NE: [Laughs] I would have guessed that the Administration’s patience would have limits. Here’s my reasoning: a lot of the Administration’s patience since January, during the second Bush term, has revolved around trying to get the [American] North Korea diplomatic team all in place. The obvious missing piece through most of 2005 was the appointment of a U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. That appointment would be indispensable for any recommendation of sanctions to the U.N. Security Council. With the recess appointment of John Bolton, the entire U.S. roster is now in place. With the latest talks, I would have thought that the Administration is not only probing the North Koreans’ intentions, but laying the groundwork for alternatives—demonstrating that further talks would be fruitless, and pulling together allies and interlocutors for a further pressure campaign. But [implicitly denying the presence of the stock ticker] that would just be my guess.

OFK: You’ve suggested that we should declare the talks a failure now. But given the importance of making this someone else’s fault in the eyes of as many people as possible, what’s the harm in waiting another week or two, since this has become a charade anyway?

NE: I’m not privy to the U.S. government’s playbook on dealing with the North Korean nuclear crisis. If the U.S. government’s playbook runs along lines you’ve just laid out, that seems entirely unobjectionable. The important point is that U.S. diplomats and policy-makers be under no illusions that failure can be turned to triumph by describing black as white such a sufficient number of times.

OFK: In your June piece for The American Enterprise, you urged the administration to define failure for the talks and be prepared to declare failure when we get there. So this is going to be a multi-parter. . . . First, help us with your definition of failure.

NE: I would define failure as a refusal by the DPRK government to agree to the objective of complete denuclearization, and/or refusal to engage in forthcoming and cooperative disclosure on the entire past history of the DPRK nuclear effort.

OFK: Ambassador Chris Hill has talked about North Korea having to make a fundamental decision about giving up its nuclear programs. Does that, or anything else, suggest that the Administration finally gets it?

NE: I don’t know Ambassador Hill well, I’ve only met him. People talk highly of his skills and acumen. That’s promising language. It’s necessary but not sufficient to show that people in U.S. government get the problem, but it doesn’t reveal his innermost thoughts about the U.S. government’s game plan.

OFK: How does Chung Dong-Young’s latest affect the odds of any success at the talks?

NE: It does affect the success. It affects the North Korean chance for success. He’s helped those out quite considerably. Almost every time he’s opened his mouth, he’s strengthened the North Korean position [pauses to think]. I can’t think of one exception off-hand.

OFK: How has the State Department’s outlook changed since Secretary Rice replaced Secretary Powell?

NE: This is a little bit of Kremlinology—looking at an organization from afar. My distant observer’s perception is that an untrusted team has been replaced by a trusted team, from the White House perspective. The Powell team was kept on a two-foot leash, mainly because of a lack of White House confidence, I would guess. We now have a transmission belt of Bush loyalists on North Korea policy. Secretary Rice, John Bolton, Robert Zoellick, and Ambassador Hill are all people who enjoy the trust of the White House, and the President personally. I surmise that a second-term Bush Administration diplomatic team will have more lee-way on making initiatives in [of?] consequence.

OFK: Did The Korea Times ever clarify its misstatements about your position on the alliance to your satisfaction?

NE: [Laughs] Oh, you read that, did you? Well, they published my letter, which was very gracious, and also I got a very gracious and sincere apology from the author. It was an honest mistake. I think that the author simply confused my position with that of one of the other authors from the June TAE issue.

OFK: You oppose a complete USFK withdrawal, but then, just what level of alliance do you think North Korea serves long-term US interests? What mix, for example, of air, naval, and ground assets should we be aiming for?

NE: That’s a very important, deep, and complicated question. I am in principle in favor of a long-term U.S.-ROK alliance, because I’m convinced it can serve interests of both nations and those of peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia. That said, both sides must be in favor of the underlying principles and objectives of the alliance. It is possible to imagine circumstances under which the alliance would no longer be viable. I think Northeast Asia would be a much more dangerous place if we get to that juncture. I hope we don’t get there, but the momentum right now is not favorable.

NE: That said, I’m not a military specialist, and I should emphasize that I’m a newspaper reader when it comes to military operations and requirements. My general impression is that we have an immediate task of deterring a North Korea threat. Over the long term, we have the challenge of maintaining peace in Northeast Asia. At the very least, that will require U.S. air and naval power in the region.

OFK: Chris Nelson [author of the now-infamous Nelson Report] said that in addition to being funny and well-liked, you’re “rigid, didactic, and unwilling to admit that [your] frequent predictions about very specific actions or motives of Kim Jong-il turn out to be totally wrong.” Several questions based on this. First, has anyone spotted Chris Nelson recently? Second, what does “didactic” mean? Care to touch anything else in there?

[A slightly longer-than-expected pause preceded the awkward laughter I was anticipating]

NE: I don’t believe I’ve ever actually met Chris Nelson. “Didactic” means pedantic [OFK: well, that was no help, but click here and here] and schoolmasterish [oh].

NE: As for the rest of what he says, it’s certainly true that North Korea has not collapsed. I would have been one of the people laying odds on North Korea not being here today. There are reasons North Korea has managed to survive that I could not have even fantasized about ten years ago, such as the international rescue program that happened under Sunshine. I’d also note that I was one of the few people in the U.S. who argued that Roh Moo Hyun was electable, and that Sunshine was driving at the heart of the U.S.-ROK alliance. I haven’t heard many people disputing those arguments lately.

OFK: I want to move to the “what next” question, in the event the six-nation talks fail. In your latest piece, you said, “Washington should impose real-time penalties on Pyongyang.” Can you elaborate on what you mean here?

NE: What we have to begin to do is penalize North Korea economically. The United States can increase North Korea’s economic penalties more or less unilaterially thru the Proliferation Security Initiative—working, of course, with those nations that have joined the PSI, and leading that coalition. We should be doing that anyhow. That’s just police work.

NE: We should also insist on a more humanitarian food aid program, which is to say a more intrusive and accountable food program, versus the one the World Food Program and others are kicking in for now. The current program feeds the North Korea government better than it feeds North Korea people. We should change that immediately.

NE: One other issue here is the need to confer more effectively with our European allies on international aid flows to the DPRK. Europe professes great concern for human rights in principle. North Korea is the worst human rights disaster on earth.

NE: The most important and difficult areas in aid flow are with South Korea and China. The U.S. needs to be much more effective in making its case to the South Korean public that aiding the North Korean state means endangering the South Korean state. The South Korean government is almost unconditionally supporting North Korea through its aid programs. That unconditional aid does not reflect the actual state of public opinion in South Korea; in fact, the South Korean public is deeply divided on the question of unconditional aid to the North. Making the case against unconditional aid to the North in various venues would be very helpful changing South Korean policies in this regard.

NE: China is another source of unconditional aid to the North. As long as Seoul is completely off the reservation on supporting North Korea through aid, China has much less reason to make hard choices on North Korea. The road to a stricter Chinese aid policy leads through Seoul. If we can convince South Korea to have a more rational, less emotional and ideological policy about aid to North Korea, we are more likely to succeed with China as well.

OFK: Did you see the story in this morning’s Chosun Ilbo on the survey of Korean youth?

NE: Yes.

OFK: What’s your reaction to that?

NE: Depending on how you phrase a question, you can get really imbalanced responses in one direction or other, particularly in South Korean polls. I think this is one of those cases, where the results have been exaggerated by the way the question was posed. That said, the point that many people in South Korea now look at the U.S. as a security problem and North Korea as a partner cannot be denied, and that’s a big problem for the alliance.

OFK: In your last piece in TAE, you said that “[t]he country [North Korea] is highly vulnerable to economic pressure . . . .” Others would argue that a country as poor as North Korea is actually less vulnerable to economic pressure.

NE: I think that is empirically incorrect. I think it was last fall, I published an article called “The Persistence of North Korea.” What I tried to show in that study is that North Korea’s unidentified foreign sources of funding had increased very substantially since 1998, since the Sunshine era commenced. In the mid-1990s, the DPRK was in famine, the regime was describing its situation as an “arduous march.” That period ended precisely when this upswing in foreign funding commenced. North Korean economy is a bizarre, distorted, jack-assed contraption. I agree that if you study history, coercive economic diplomacy seldom achieves its objectives. But North Korea is so economically vulnerable that North Korea is an unusually promising candidate for economic pressure.

OFK: Why would China help us in the U.N.?

NE: We can’t know until we try, but my hunch is that Chinese leadership, in the final analysis, will have to be rational about its own interests in Northeast Asia, and an aggressive nuclear North Korea is even more subversive of Beijing’s interests than a pressure campaign against the DPRK that may involve Chinese risks.

NE: The reason I say this is that China’s exposure to North Korean brinksmanship entails the possibility of very real costs in China’s strategic situation and China’s domestic stability. If the DPRK emerges as an aggressive nuclear power, the nuclear disposition of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan cannot be presumed to remain constant. Our ambassador in Japan has made this point. An aggressive nuclear North Korea will also invite responses in missile defense in South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan. None of these results is in china’s interest.

NE: I also mention that there’s a domestic concern for China. An aggressive nuclear North Korea could cause a business crisis in Northeast Asia—I don’t think it’s difficult to imagine how—leading to a downturn in trade, investment, and economic growth in region. It would only take a matter of months for this to lead to higher urban unemployment rates in china. If I read the newspapers correctly, China’s leaders are very concerned about stability these days. Rising unemployment is not the way to improve stability and reduce social tensions.

NE: The U.S. government can encourage the Chinese leadership to think about its own interests in North Korea more clearly. If we encourage the Chinese leadership to think about its own interests in North Korea more clearly, we will find that our interests overlap is larger than we’ve thought to date.

OFK: Do you think the United States is seriously considering a blockade?

NE: I think there are circumstances under which US would have to consider a blockade. We’re not there yet, and I hope we never get there. The idea that military action is inconceivable is wrong. It would be an awful set of circumstances that would bring us to that point, but we would have to consider it.

OFK: [Korea expert] Balbina Hwang recently cited estimates that North Korea’s overseas deposits are “as high as” $5 billion [in this August 2003 piece]. Do you expect the United States to try to freeze those assets?

NE: I don’t know if that estimate is correct or not. Of course, it would be a smart and a good thing to search for and identify overseas DPRK assets. I wonder, though, whether DPRK assets are as large as some analysts have guessed. North Korea was in such a delicate economic situation in mid-90s that it would seem puzzling for the regime not to have used some of those “rainy-day” funds to relieve possible tensions that arose from that situation.

OFK: In The End of North Korea, [published in 2000] you made the point that North Korean trade with the U.S. would not likely expand much, for reasons that are internal to North Korean policy. The mirror image of this is that re-imposing sanctions would not do much, either. And of course, but for the lack of MFN trade status and sanctions on dual-use components, we really don’t have many sanctions on North Korea today.

NE: That’s right, but the real impact of our economic policy is often overlooked. It’s not the trade sanctions per se. The real financial bite from the U.S. sanctions is that the U.S. is obligated vote against North Korean membership in the International Monetary fund, which prevents it from getting access to international loans or grants. But North Korea is perfectly capable of failing as international exporter without our help.

OFK: Recently, you’ve been much more outspoken about humanitarian issues in relation to North Korea. I want to address the intersection of the humanitarian and economic issues, specifically the famine. Some NGOs have discussed the link between hunger and songbun, which is a measure of political classification and oppression. Some have raised comparisons to Stalin’s selective mass starvation in the Ukraine in the 1930s—I’ve raised them myself. Do you think that there’s evidence to support such a comparison?

NE: Well, the evidence comes from the escapees, who’ve described the starvation in North Korea in the 1990s.

OFK: Do you think that this starvation was deliberate, at least to some extent?

NE: There’s very little arguing that the regime made decisions about who should get food, and who should not. The suspect or disfavored strata were certainly not preferentially treated in allocation of food through the Public Distribution System. Since death toll and suffering from the famine in some measure seems regionally specific, it’s clear that the regime made some choices. I don’t think this was so much a pan opticon decree that some elements should be sentenced to death. I suspect it was more like the process that the Nazis called selektion [selecting who would live and who wouldn’t]. Another way to put it is that being in a disfavored status near Pyongyang, or being in a favored status, was better than being in a disfavored status near the Russian border.

OFK: Assume China and South Korea block our every efforts to relieve the human rights and famine problems in the North. What could America do to make a tangible difference in either situation?

NE: As things stand now, both South Korea and China are disposed to ignore the humanitarian disaster in North Korea. That’s why need to have a diplomatic strategy for dealing with human rights. The [Chinese and South Korean policies] are not fixed or immutable positions. The road to changing South Korea’s regrettable policy for dealing with human rights leads through Europe. The South Korean government, so heavily composed of former human rights activists, can be shamed into a more humane policy toward refugees from the DPRK.

NE: The way to shame the South Korean government is to form an international coalition to persuade people worldwide that the current situation cannot be tolerated. To do so will involve a lot of spadework with governments and NGOs in Europe, especially among the new, formerly communist, democracies. I don’t think South Korea wants to try to make the case that North Korea should be an exception to worldwide human rights principles. Obviously, we have plenty of work to do in developing that coalition, but it’s there for the building. If such a coalition were developed, there are so many promising reasons to expect that groups and people in South Korea will support a more humanitarian policy toward North Korea refugees, and that we can expect a change from the see-no-evil Sunshine approach toward North Korea.

NE: Just as the road to South Korea leads through Europe, the road to China leads through South Korea. Without the cover that South Korea’s current position provides, China will be exposed to more important choices. That importance rises as we approach 2008. China is not isolated from the calculus of costs and benefits [here, Eberstadt stopped for a pregnant consideration of his choice of words]. China wants the Beijing Olympics to be success, not an embarrassing failure.

OFK: You’re an advocate of assisting North Korean refugees, but some of those who opposed the North Korean Human Rights Act or confrontation with North Korea over human rights have accused the United States of hypocrisy in offering asylum to North Korean refugees. After all, not one North Korean refugee has been given asylum in the USA, and the NKHRA did not include a provision for Temporary Protected Status. Are we all a bunch of hypocrites for offering something we appear to have been unprepared to actually give?

NE: The confusion about accepting North Korea refugees into the United States is the tiniest corner of our INS mess. I don’t think that anyone who is familiar with it thinks our INS works like a normal and healthy operation. There is an even bigger problem than what we see through this small aperture: a badly broken INS.

OFK: But those few North Koreans who arrived in the United States had already taken first refuge elsewhere, meaning that they were ineligible for asylum anyway.

NE: The U.S. gesture of offering asylum to North Korean refugees follows a tradition of 200 years of acting on the principles later recorded in the language on the placard on the Statue of Liberty. We have to be very clear that the South Korean Constitution recognizes North Koreans as South Korean citizens if they so much as raise hands and say, “Take us home.” Given how much emphasis today’s South Korea places on constitutional rights and the rule of law, we should encourage the government to take another look at Article III.

OFK: I noticed that North Korea’s negotiating posture seemed to become temporarily more flexible after Kang Chol-Hwan’s visit. That flexibility didn’t last, of course, but do you think North Korea takes the threat of US support for a political alternative to the regime seriously?

NE: The North Korea government will take the threat of U.S. support for an alternative DPRK more seriously in proportion to the extent that the U.S. government itself takes that proposition seriously. The DPRK leadership is purportedly isolated and removed from events, but they don’t do a bad job of reading the papers. They may even surf the Internet from time to time. North Korea is capable of doing those calculations on its own.

OFK: Now for a wacky question. There is exactly one way I can think of to seriously challenge the North Korean regime’s hold on power without Chinese or South Korean cooperation: to support an anti-government resistance movement inside North Korea, supplying it clandestinely, perhaps from off the coast. In your wildest dreams, can you envision the United States providing clandestine support for an anti-Kim Jong-Il resistance movement?

NE: It certainly shouldn’t be ruled out. My impression as a newspaper reader is that the history of covert operations in North Korea over the last half century is not one of ringing successes. That said, all options should remain on the table when dealing with a government opposed to basic principles of international peace and cooperation.

OFK: Mr. Eberstadt, thank you for being so considerate of your time.

NE: Thank you. I enjoy your Web site very much.

[End of interview]

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One final point I’d add, in addition to thanking Mr. Eberstadt for the kind plug for my site—he’s such a mensch that he never even mentioned his new book. So I just did.

N. Korea Executes Christians for Their Beliefs

From the Joongang Ilbo, a major South Korea daily, comes a new report of a ruthless new wave of religious persecution:

Citing interviews with North Korean defectors, a Seoul-based research institute said yesterday that the regime in Pyongyang is continuing an aggressive campaign to suppress underground churches in the country.

The 2005 North Korea Human Rights White Paper published by the Korea Institute of National Unification reported a number of executions of religious figures operating underground Protestant churches in the North. In 2001, five people found guilty of conducting missionary work were executed by firing squad in Nampo.

North Korean defectors are quoted in the report as saying that Pyongyang is doing everything it can to stop the spread of Protestantism in the communist country. According to the report, 86 members of underground churches were rounded up in the early 1990s in Anak, South Hanghae province, some of whom were executed while the rest were sent to political prisons.

A North Korean defector said he had once participated in a three-year long operation to uproot an underground church in 1996. Since 1997, North Korea has been instructing its people to report any kind of proselytizing to the authorities.

Second North Korean Family Defects by Sea in a Week

ABC News reports that an entire family has sailed to South Korea. It’s the second sea-borne defection in a week, and doesn’t include last week’s defection by a North Korean soldier through the wire at the DMZ:

A couple and their nine-year-old son defected from famine-hit North Korea by boat on Sunday and were being questioned on South Korea’s western island of Baekryong, the military said.

The South Korean navy picked up the 42-year-old man, identified as Hong, his 39-year-old wife and their son after they crossed the border in the Yellow Sea, officials at the South’s Joint Chiefs of Staff office said.

The last couple to defect (just a week ago) arrived at the same island. The Chosun Ilbo tells us more about the family and its origin:

They were said to have left Gumipo in North Korea’s Hwanghae Province at dawn. They were quoted as saying they fled the harsh living conditions in the North.

The Hong family is the second to defect by sea this month after a couple defected to the South in a dinghy on June 17.

Careful observers will note that Hwanghae is North Korea’s main rice-growing region. If famine has spread to Hwanghae, the North is in serious trouble indeed. Yonhap adds some ominous details about how the Southern authorities are handling the matter:

The North Koreans said they left the North on Saturday due to poverty. An investigation was under way to determine their exact motive for defecting.

Why ominous, you ask? Because the South Koreans have told us what that investigation might entail.

Also last week, a North Korean soldier was found hiding in a truckload of Moon Pies and ramen noodles in a South Korean border village. Somewhere in there is something deeply symbolic. However he got through, South Korean soldiers detected no one found a trace of his passage:

Another defector, identified as Lee Yong-su, 20, was discovered in Daema village, Gangwon province 5:50 a.m. yesterday by a local resident. Mr. Lee was wearing a tattered North Korean military uniform and a Kim Il Sung badge.

According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff investigating Mr. Lee, the defector said he was a soldier in an artillery battalion of the North Korean army in Pyeonggang county. He told the investigators that he made the decision after watching on television how developed South Korea was. Mr. Lee claimed he reached the fences in the DMZ early Monday morning and crossed over the next day.

Freedom House to Broadcast July Human Rights Conference Into North Korea

Recently, Freedom House selected Professor Jae Ku as its North Korea Program Director. I met Professor Ku at a meeting of the North Korean Freedom Coalition in Arlington, Virginia, and he agreed to an interview.

Thanks to Prof. Ku for being so generous with his time (continue to interview).

A Great Leap Downward? North Korea Orders Millions of City Dwellers Into the Countryside

The New York Times is reporting more troubling signs that famine may be returning to North Korea:

Even if this is strictly temporary, it must be deeply disruptive to the North Korean economy. These city-dwellers must be wondering why they are being sent to the fields in higher numbers than ever. The Chosun Ilbo’s coverage suggests that for some, this may be something more than a temporary movement.

Pyongyang is traditionally reserved for North Korea’s “core” class. One wonders how many will be disallowed from returning. Stay tuned.

U.S. Meets With North Korea One On One

The Associated Press reports that U.S. officials met with North Korean officials in New York last week to discuss American policy toward the Stalinist state.

From California Yankee.

N. Korea Able To Arm Missile With Nuke

The Associated Press reports the Defense Intelligence Agency chief says North Korea is able to arm a missile with a nuclear weapon.

From California Yankee.

U.S. Considers Blockade Resolution as N. Korea Prepares for Possible Nuclear Test

Today’s New York Times reports two major new developments in the North Korea story. The Administration’s long-lived patience with North Korea may finally be at an end as it contemplates asking the U.N. for a resolution that would authorize any nation to stop North Korean ship and planes to search for nuclear material. Meanwhile, North Korea may be preparing to test a nuclear weapon. First, the general terms of the conceptual resolution:

The resolution envisioned by a growing number of senior administration officials would amount to a quarantine of North Korea, though, so far at least, President Bush’s aides are not using that word. It would enable the United States and other nations to intercept shipments in international waters off the Korean Peninsula and to force down aircraft for inspection.

But, said several American and Asian officials, the main purpose would be to give China political cover to police its long border with North Korea, the impoverished country’s lifeline for food and oil. That border is now largely open for shipments of arms, drugs and counterfeit currencies, North Korea’s main source of hard currency.

Previous leaks from the Bush Administration have suggested an emerging strategy of isolating North Korea economically to deprive its rulers of the hard currency they need to sustain their regime.

In late January, the Administration concluded that North Korea sold enriched uranium to the A.Q Khan network, and ultimately to Libya. In early February, North Korea recently walked out of nuclear disarmament talks and declared itself a nuclear power. Later that month, the North threatened to attack U.S. installations in South Korea. Most recently, North Korea shut down its plutonium reactor at Yongbyong, a prerequisite to removing fuel rods it could then reprocess into weapons-grade material. Neither China nor South Korea has been willing to force North Korea to choose between the aid and trade benefits they both provide and returning to the talks in earnest.

Activity at the site in October and again in January led to concerns that North Korea may be preparing for the first underground weapons test - which would end any ambiguity about whether it has the technology to build a warhead.

“They are either heading toward a full nuclear breakout, so that we are forced to deal with them as an established nuclear power, or they are putting on quite a show for our satellites,” said one senior administration official, who added that the quarantine option had not yet been formally presented to President Bush.

The White House has said little so far about North Korea’s actions, following a strategy very different from the one it pursued two years ago with Iraq. Ms. Rice has repeatedly said that North Korea’s pattern is to seek a public reaction from Washington, and she has made clear she does not intend to oblige.

But some experts say the statements and actions North Korea have taken recently could mark a significant shift in strategy: It may now see a chance to build a modest nuclear arsenal while the United States and Asian nations debate how to react. The C.I.A. estimates that North Korea already has enough plutonium for six or eight nuclear weapons.

“I’m afraid they are now more interested in getting away with it than getting a reaction out of the United States,” South Korea’s former foreign minister, Han Sung Joo, said in an interview last week.

In February 2004, the New York Times reported that North Korea may have tested a nuclear weapon in Pakistan in 1998, as part of its cooperation with the A.Q. Khan network. Although the exposure of the Khan network would make continued Pakistani cooperation with North Korea prohibitively risky, Time Asia has reported that North Korea also cooperates extensively with Iran in its nuclear weapons development.

HT: The Lost Nomad

North Korea Preparing Nuclear Arms Test

The Washington Times reports that U.S. intelligence agencies have detected activity at facilities in North Korea indicating the country may be preparing to conduct its first nuclear test.

From California Yankee.

Mystery Ship Crosses into N. Korea; S. Korean Navy Fires Warning Shots

UPDATE: Looks like I was wrong. It appears to be the act of a lone drunk who opted for the Workers’ Paradise. That’s going to be some hangover.

ORIGINAL POST: The Chosun Ilbo calls it a defection, but without knowing more than what’s in the article, I’d say a more likely theory is that some North Korean infiltrators were on their way home.

South Korean coastal border guards fired some 20 warning shots from a 60 mm mortar, 106 mm recoilless rifle and MG50 machine gun, but were unable to stop the ship crossing the NLL.

It’s strictly my own speculation at this point, and a definitive explanation may not be forthcoming, but I’ll be the first to admit it if I’m wrong. This piece by Andrei Lankov is must-read background material (the man’s timing is pretty extraordinary, no?). Not that the current South Korean regime would eagerly admit such a possibility.

Whose hostile policy, Minister Chung?

UPDATE: CNN reports that the vessel appears to have been a South Korean fishing boat.

North Korea to Expel U.N. Aid Workers

The Washington Times reports that North Korea has announced that it will expel U.N. aid workers, claiming that their help is no longer needed:

The announcement follows reports of a North Korean crackdown on defections, suspected dissenters, and foreign cell phones and videotapes, which are increasingly penetrating North Korea’s closed society. Yesterday, a Japanese TV network aired video of the public executions of eleven North Koreans for opposing the regime and aiding defectors. North Korea may perceive foreign aid workers as a threat to the wall of secrecy and isolation the regime has built between its citizens and the outside world.

Sources familiar with the issue said the number of international staffers present in the country, including nongovernmental aid groups, has worried Pyongyang for some time. “There’s no need for [OCHA] to stay … once ongoing projects are finished,” a North Korean diplomatic source said on the condition of anonymity. “We need assistance, but not humanitarian. It should be development assistance such as machinery for agriculture,” the source said. Mr. Egeland said he was still hopeful he could persuade Pyongyang not to close the OCHA office. “In our view the humanitarian crisis is continuing. Still [there’s] a great shortage of food and there’s a great shortage of medicines,” he said.

The World Food Program reports that 36% of North Koreans are undernourished, that 57% do not get enough to keep them healthy, and currently targets 6.5 million North Koreans (out of a total population of 22.4 million) for food aid. North Korea recently reduced its food rations to 250 grams per person per day, the equivalent of two medium-sized potatoes.

North Korea Publicly Executes Eleven in Hoeryong

Daily NK, a news site run by North Korean defectors, has posted a story and images captured from a video that, according to a Japanese TV network, shows political prisoners being brought before a firing squad. The video was taken in Hoeryong, which is emerging as a focal point of resistance. The pictures are very blurry and the usual cautions about authenticity apply, but Daily NK quotes defectors as confirming the location and suggesting that the tape is authentic. The video allegedly shows the “trials,” judgement, and of course, execution. The entire town was ordered to go to the scene and watch—including the children.

Usually in North Korea, when public executions take place, the criminals are tied to a pillar and executors stand 10-15 m in front of him for a total of nine rounds of gun shot, three shots each to head, chest, and abdomen. When the criminal is shot, the rope breaks and the dead body falls forward. All of such scenes are contained in this video. Currently, North Korea is known to be the only country where public executions take place, with the public informed (and attends to), including children. Until now, North Korea has bluntly denied such public executions of shooting takes places in the country, which the accusations made by the international human rights organizations who reported and condemned of it.

Senior U.S. Diplomat Hints at 'Further Measures' Against North Korea

U.S. Ambassador to South Korea Christopher Hill, in a hearing for his confirmation to the post of Assistant Secretary of State for Asian and Pacific Affairs, has given the most explicit signal yet that the Bush Administration will not tolerate the continued lack of progress in the six-party talks. Reuters reports:

Hill did not suggest that the United States intended to use force, hinting instead at a policy of economic isolation of the regime. Hill also stressed the Administration’s preference for a diplomatic solution. He went on to suggest that “any country doing any business” with North Korea should consider whether its activities encourage North Korea’s “bad behavior.” Hill singled out Russia by name, but his comments also appeared to have been aimed at China and South Korea, which is developing a massive low-wage industrial park in North Korea:

“I would like to look very carefully to see what more Russia could do . . . I think with respect to Russia, with respect to any country doing any business with North Korea, . . . we need to look very carefully at what they are doing . . . with a view to determining, are they somehow encouraging bad behavior from the North Koreans or are they encouraging North Korea to come back to the table.”

Hill criticized China for failing to exert sufficient pressure on North Korea to force it to return to the talks, saying, “It’s our view that China as the host of this process should make sure they get everybody to the table.” Ambassador-designate to South Korea Joseph DeTrani, currently the U.S. special envoy to the six-country talks, pointedly mentioned that China supplies 60 percent of North Korea’s energy and 60 percent of its food.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted to recommend that the full Senate confirm both Hill and De Trani.

Japan, formerly a major trading partner of North Korea, imposed new shipping insurance requirements on March 1st. The new regulations, not formally styled as sanctions, have effectively blocked most trade with North Korea by imposing a financial requirement that few North Korean ships can afford.

Bush to Name Bolton as U.N. Ambassador

The Washington Post reports that President Bush will name John Bolton as the new American Ambassador to the United Nations, signaling that the administration maybe be ready to make an international issue of human rights in North Korea, which allowed as many as two million of its people to starve to death while the regime squandered its coffers on arms and luxuries for its elite. The move also suggests that the administration may be ready to bring North Korea’s nuclear weapons program before the U.N. Security Council.

North Korea recently withdrew from six-nation talks over its weapons programs. Recently, it has suggested that it may return to the talks in exchange for further concessions and aid from the United States.

North Korea once famously called Bolton “human scum” over his comments about the state of human rights in North Korea. Bolton promises to be the most ideologically straightforward and hawkish ambassador since Jeanne Kirkpatrick.

N. Korea Wants an Apology

AP:

North Korea demanded that the United States apologize for designating the country as an “outpost of tyranny” and it threatened to resume long-range missile tests. However, the North also held out the possibility of returning to nuclear disarmament talks if Washington agrees to coexist with the communist country.

North Korea declared Feb. 10 that it had nuclear weapons and was boycotting talks aimed at ending its nuclear ambitions.

North Korea 'U-turn' on US talks

The BBC reports:

A North Korean official has said his government no longer wants even bilateral talks with the United States over its nuclear weapons programme. Pyongyang had been demanding direct negotiations with the US for two years. Earlier this month, North Korea confirmed it had nuclear weapons and withdrew from discussions with its neighbours and the US.

North Korean Elites Celebrate Kim Jong-Il's Birthday by Feasting on Pheasant and Venison

MSNBC News reports on Kim Jong-Ils’ birthday celebrations from North Korea:

Those not among North Korea’s elite classes were reportedly given cold noodles and extra rations of alcohol. North Korea recently reduced rations for its starving population to 250 grams per person per day—the equivalent of two medium-sized potatoes—which is just half of the amount the World Food Program recommends as a minimum for subsistence.

Press reports did not mention any public appearance by Kim Jong-Il himself. A recent report published in the Times of London noted growing speculation that Kim may have lost a behind-the-scenes struggle for power. Last November, Kim’s portraits, which had previously been treated like sacred icons, began disappearing from official venues. Mr. Kim has since failed to meet either of two congressional delegations that visted North Korea in January. More recently, North Korean radio has begun discussing the succession to power to one of Mr. Kim’s sons. Kim Jong-Il is the son of Kim Il-Sung, founder of North Korea’s Stalinist government.

Mr. Kim was last seen by a foreigner on October 3, 2004. Other appearances mainly consisted of inspections of military units, sometimes accompanied by stock footage showing Mr. Kim surrounded by loyal and adoring soldiers. The Times reporters noted that in Mr. Kim’s recent appearances, his clothing appeared to be the same as that he had worn in previous appearances.

U.S. Plans Financial Squeeze of North Korea

Legal Non-Military Trade, $600 Million per year
Weapons, $560 Million
Illegal Drug Trafficking, $100 Million
Counterfeiting, $100 Million
Overseas Remittances, $100 Million

N. Korea Admits to Nukes, Backs Out of Talks

Fox News reports:

SEOUL, South Korea — North Korea (search) publicly admitted Thursday for the first time that it has nuclear weapons, and said it wouldn’t return to six-nation talks aimed at getting it to abandon its nuclear ambitions…

Letter, Purportedly from High-Level Dissenter, Attacks N. Korean Regime

That’s the claim about the letter I print below, via Suzanne Scholte (scroll down) of the Defense Forum Foundation, America’s most prominent campaigner for North Korean human rights. It requires no explanation, only the obvious caveats that (1) there’s simply no way to verify the source, (2) this could very easily be something other than what it purports to be, and (3) the contents of the letter clearly serve the interests of those (like me, as a matter of full disclosure) who seek to destroy the North Korean one-party regime through increased economic pressure and political subversion.

If authentic, the letter raises one more barrier to the economic and social reunification of the Koreas—North Koreans’ well-justified resentment that South Koreans are helping to prolong their suffering and enslavement.

We were able to obtain a copy of the original hand written letter that was sent by fax by a high ranking North Korean government official when he was visiting China to South Korea’s largest newspaper, Chosun Ilbo.

As the rest of the world is well-aware, 3 million people starved to death and 1.2 million were left wandering about the country during so called, “the Stride in Suffering,” between 1995 and 1998. As a result, North Koreans have turned away from Kim Jung Il, and no one has even the slightest lingering attachment left for him. The only thing remaining is a deep root of hatred toward him.

Although I cannot disclose the details, I can assure you that a large number of anti-governmental forces exist within North Korea. A growing number of the elites are lying low waiting for the right time to come so that they can punish Kim Jung Il, the traitor of the Korean people. Others who share their views are also coming together for the same goal.

In 1990, we had an excellent opportunity to overthrow Kim Jung Il when “the Stride in Suffering” began. Kim Jung Il was using extreme measures to suppress the citizens in order to sustain his control over the country causing utter confusion. He used the military to recklessly kill the innocent and put them in political prisoner camps. It is true in any history that the louder the citizens complain, the stronger the rebellious sprit grows. During “the Stride in Suffering” North Korea was in such chaos that every aspect of the country, including the politics, economy, and national security, broke down beyond a manageable realm, and many North Koreans left the country for China.

What we really wanted during this time was that more North Koreans would leave for China so that that the international community would really pin down Kim Jung Il. If so, I believe even the cruelest Kim Jung Il would not have been able to withstand the pressure.

However, South Korea and the international community supported North Korea, and the severe suffering started again for the anti-governmental forces in North Korea. North Korean defectors in China were repatriated and lost their lives in prisons or at open executions. It makes my blood boil to think about all the North Korean defectors who were dragged back to North Korea and had to face such miserable deaths. To make the situation worse, South Korea began its mission to save Kim Jung Il as if they were indebted to him.

I have enough information to describe in detail about how the U.S. dollars and humanitarian relief goods were distributed, but I do not feel the need to do so. However, I would like to reemphasize the obvious fact that Kim Jung Il’s government has no interest in the welfare of its citizens whatsoever. Kim Jung Il wasted away the relief aids from other countries for the purpose of maintaining his power and never used it for our citizens.

It appears that there is a movement within South Korea that attempts to beautify Kim Jung Il suggesting that he has made some positive changes. This is why I need to explain what happened in North Korea after “the Stride in Suffering.”

The Economy Management Reform directives which came out in July, 2002 did nothing but to transfer the responsibilities of the government to the individuals. The actual market prices replaced the government distribution system which was useless and existed in name only. Businesses need a certain amount of freedom of discretion, which is not allowed in North Korea, and that is why there is no such thing as private business in North Korea. Some people manage to obtain the government’s permission to do business at public facilities and earn between 1 won and 3 won ($15 ~ $45) a month. The majority of the workers who cannot afford the bribery money to obtain the permission have no other choice but to continue to work under strict government control without being paid properly.

Recently South Korean soap operas became popular in North Korea, and this triggered the house-searching frenzy by the government and tighter control measures on commuting routes.
There were some raised expectations that private farms might be allowed, but it has fallen through. Another rumor suggested that the Agricultural Cooperative Association will distribute the land to institutions and businesses, but nothing has been done so far. Individuals are allowed to farm small tracks of land up to 300 pyung (1 pyung = about 4 square yards). These tracks are prepared by the individuals through forest clearing. Any piece of land that is larger than 300 pyung is controlled by the government.

Despite the government’s restrictions, there are those who fight for more land in desperation. They manage to farm on lands as large as few thousand pyungs, but after paying the taxes for using the land there is hardly anything left, and the bitterness is growing fast amongst the farmers. Nonetheless, people who are able to farm any type of land are better off than others since they can at least gather something to eat.

After giving up their crops for the mandatory contribution to the military and government officers, there is nothing left for the farmers. They are often forced to seek other means for survival, and end up stealing from their neighbors. Everyone has turned into a thief, and they steal from one another.

Every fall, the farmers in North Korea are left only with empty ears of corn. I heard the harvest in Hwang Hae province is better this year, but there is also a report that the mandatory contributions to the military will increase. The farmers are already furious about this.

The situation is not better for the military. The lack of food in North Korea is so serious that even the military is suffering. People call the military “pest forces,” the gangsters,” “thieves’ military” and “punitive forces” (this word originated from the Japanese punitive forces that oppressed Koreans during the Japanese occupation). They also call it “malnutrition forces” because of the widespread severe malnutrition in the military. Soldiers attack private homes and assault civilians every day. The public resentment toward the military is stronger than ever. Moreover, the morale within the military is on the brink of a collapse.

As a hopelessly corrupted country, North Korea is accelerating toward its final destruction. Kim Jung Il’s cruelty has worsened in desperation to preserve his power. Torture and executions became more and more common. He strengthened the punishment for those who flee the country, but he is careful about the public because of the pressure from the international community.

High-ranking officials in North Korea are well aware of what is going on in South Korea since North Koreans’ interest in information from the outside world has grown dramatically. These days, not only the high-ranking officers but also the mid-ranking officials and young people in North Korea listen to Radio Free Asia and gain information. We know who is helping Kim Jung Il and who is working hard for the freedom and human rights of North Koreans.

I hope to see more North Koreans cross the border to China in protest against Kim Jung Il, but sadly they have known for a while that China and South Korea are indifferent about rescuing them, giving them the cold shoulder. North Koreans are trapped within their own country waiting to die either by starvation or torture.

The anti-government forces and the North Korean officers who share the same goal are extremely unhappy with South Korea’s policy toward North Korea, and the hatred against the South Korean government is growing.

Kim Jung Il is cornered and has nowhere to go. I am certain that no one in North Korea is even remotely fond of him in any way. I think his luck is running out even though he frantically tries to oppress the citizens with military forces, scaring them with guns and knives. The soldiers can see that their families are starving to death. If a soldier who has a head on his soldier, how could he possibly perceive all this as normal? I think I have said enough to help you realize what is necessary in order to tear down Kim Jung Il’s regime and liberate North Koreans who trust you as brothers and sisters in the worst of times as these.

Kae Sung Industrial District is nothing but a channel to bring in foreign currency for Kim Jung Il, who is constantly running out of money. This is also true about the Keum Kang Mountain Tour project. Kim Jung Il needs South Korea’s money, and the success of the relationship between North and South will depend on how much money he gets. In other words, it will depend on how satisfied “Our General” is. The more money he gets, the better the North-South relations will be, and vice versa. Note that this is not about the relationship between North Korea and South Korea, but rather the relationship between Kim Jung Il and South Korea.

There is no other way to save North Koreans from their misery without pressuring Kim Jung Il to the point of suffocation. We need to cut off the financial support in order to dismantle the Liberation Army and weaken North Korea’s intelligence agency. If the U.S., Japan and South Korea gather their resources to pressure Kim Jung Il, he will have to choose between the collapse and the reformation, that is to open up. I plead with you again to consider the anguish of North Korean who live like slaves. Someday, the just judgment of North Koreans will be against those who help Kim Jung Il.

Thank you.
Kim Sung Kil (pseudonym)

North Korea Threatens U.S. Bases; South Korea Drops North as 'Main Enemy'

From CNN:

North Korea will turn U.S. military bases in the region into a “sea of fire” if war breaks out on the Korean Peninsula, North Korean media on Friday quoted a communist officer as saying. The North’s state-run news media highlighted the comment hours after South Korea released a new defense policy paper that revealed a U.S. reinforcement plan to dispatch 690,000 troops and 2,000 warplanes if war breaks out in Korea.

Most U.S. Army personnel in Korea are presently stationed within twenty miles of the Korean DMZ, within range of thousands of North Korean artillery pieces. Much of the North Korean artillery is sited inside underground roll-in / roll-out emplacements. Other U.S. installations are located in the middle of crowded residential areas in the South Korean cities of Seoul, Taegu, and Pusan.

For the first time, the South Korean Defense Ministry’s annual white paper does not list North Korea as its “main enemy.” Although attitudes among South Koreans have grown increasingly pro-North Korean and anti-American, the South Korean government recently asked the United States to slow down the planned withdrawal of one-third of the U.S. forces from South Korea.

Some South Koreans want to keep U.S. forces in their country to act as a “trip wire” in the event of a North Korean attack. Others fear the economic impact of U.S. troop withdrawals. Others want the troops to remain near the DMZ to restrict U.S. options. They believe that without thousands of U.S. troops in North Korean artillery range, the United States would be free to consider attacks against North Korean nuclear facilities.

American troops in South Korea have recently been the victims of a spate of violent assaults. Recent polling data suggest that the U.S. defense contribution to South Korea, which, according to the Cato institute, costs U.S. taxpayers $15-20 billion annually, has resulted in little appreciation from the South Korean people. According to one