To comment on Snapshots of Algeria and France, re the antisemitic bit:
I have a friend here in San Francisco who is presently 24 years old. He was raised in Paris in an Orthodox Jewish Family, and has only lived here in the states for the last five years.
He has told me that a few short years ago, when he was in his mid adolescence, antisemitism in Paris was copious enough that the youth in his Jewish community were compelled to take self defense courses that included a healthy amount of street fighting tactics geared toward dealing with in excess of two attackers at a time. I once had the occasion to see him employing these methods, and they were not the sort of self defense techniques one is taught for sporting or "confidence building" purposes.
What he, and subsequently a visiting childhood Jewish friend of his have told me has convinced me that anyone who writes or talks of any kind of tolerant attitude in that regard where the French are concerned is pure BS.
Further, therefore, when I hear about the French tolerance of Islam based groups that commit hate crimes against Jews in that country, I have to conclude that France, in general, is either pro Islamic extremism or anti Jewish.
One of the predominant theories on this, at least as that I have heard from others who know a lot more about France and the French than I do is that the French government is afraid to address the issue because they are afraid of provoking the militant Muslims and bringing terrorism down upon themselves. This policy is exactly the opposite of any we would follow here in the U.S., because our people are not spineless; We confront such problems to the best of our ability and do what we have to do to try to eradicate them.
Another theory, as I have already stated as my own belief, is that the French do not like Jews and as a result look the other way when they are abused by Muslims and others. In the same vein, their government's policy seems to be to cry foul whenever Israel acts in self defense against terrorism while casting the Palestinian terrorist organizations in a favorable light, even to demanding recently that Hamas be included in negotiations over the Roadmap for Peace.

The Strategy Page vs Greg Buete:

If anything, I would think the definition of the Iraq situation on the Strategy Page ENFORCES Robin Moore's opinion as depicted in Greg Buete's article.
I would respect the opinion of Robin Moore on this kind of thread more than I would that of any academic whose expertise is derived from scholarly pursuits, because Moore learned about Special Forces firsthand: In order to achieve the circumstances he needed to write The Green Berets(The book and the John Wayne film were not even remotely similar), Robin Moore had to earn a green beret himself. He went through Jump School and Unconventional Warfare School. He accompanied Special Forces units on in country missions and went into harm's way knowing a hell of a lot more about combat than any "embedded" reporter in Iraq did going in.
Anyway, back to my point: As Moore pointed out, Special Forces are trained to address situations of an unconventional nature, above and beyond that which regular troops are trained for, prepared not only on the combat end, but also on the psychological and improvisational sides. They are experts in guerilla warfare.
The problem here is that conventional commanders do not really understand the unconventional, and that goes back to Vietnam, where Special Forces(both Army and Navy variety) were not used to their fullest potentials, and the same thing applies in Iraq as it did to some extent in Afghanistan, as was pointed out in Buete's article.
The use of these very expensively trained warriors by generals and admirals has been, in many cases, comparable to buying a supercharged Lotus and then driving it only in 35mph residential neighborhoods.
Granted, they have been, and are, used in a few more suitable capacities not discussed at press conferences or only briefly touched upon, but there are times when they should be used more broadly; The situation discussed in the Strategy Page illustrates such a need; You fight guerilla forces with commandos, not with conventional troops. There is no room for Queensbury Rules in a streetfight, nor should we depend solely upon young people with basic training, which title is accurately descriptive, to address a kind of back alley warfare that can better be handled by professionals trained to fight in the same back alley.